Yiran Wang

Client-facing professionals receive compensation advances structured as debt that employers may accelerate on underperformance or separation. Using millions of US securities-industry regulatory filings, we show that advisors borrow three to four times annual income — undisclosed to clients and to credit bureaus — and spend the proceeds to lever up. When employers accelerate, delinquency becomes the largest source of advisor financial distress, and advisors whose borrowing constraints bind defraud their clients to generate the liquidity the employer demands. Using a regression discontinuity design, we estimate that up to a third of post-crisis misconduct at large securities firms is attributable to these loans.

Using the staggered state adoption of Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers (TRAP) laws, I find significant declines in both investment levels and firms' responsiveness to investment opportunities. Evidence points to a labor relocation channel: female inventors are more likely to leave restrictive states, and small and low-cash-flow firms bear disproportionate effects.